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NOTE
JUVENILE DELINQUENT
AND UNRULY PROCEEDINGS IN OHIO:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATIONS
T HE OuIO STATUTES RELATING TO JUVENILES were substantially revised
in 1969,' purportedly 2 to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate
that juveniles be afforded "the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment."3  One significant change was the removal of "conduct-illegal-
only-for-children"4 from the definition of "delinquency" 5 and its place-
ment in a new category of "unruly. '"" Juvenile courts thus retained juris-
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.01-.99 (Page Supp. 1974). For an analysis of the entire
revised juvenile court law see Willey, Ohio's Post-Gault Juvenile Court Law, 3 AKRON
L. REV. 152 (1970).
2 Whitlatch, Ohio's Revised Juvenile Court Act, 42 THE OHIO B. 1389 (1969).
3 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967), quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562
(1966). Kent was the first juvenile court case decided in the Supreme Court of the
United States. The Court affirmed that when the juvenile court, acting under a District
of Columbia statute, "waived" its jurisdiction and transferred children to the criminal
court for trial, the waiver hearings "must measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment." Id. at 562. The Kent case can be considered to stand for the proposition
that fourteenth amendment due process standards are applicable to juvenile court pro-
ceedings. M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 12-13 (1974).
Technically speaking, Kent does not rest on constitutional grounds but upon an
interpretation of the statutes of the District of Columbia. This fact does not
diminish the constitutional authority of the case. The Court was clearly an-
nouncing constitutional principles as it read the applicable legislation "in the
context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of
counsel." 383 U.S. at 557. Doubt about the constitutional authority of Kent is
dispelled by the express approval of its key passages in the Gault opinion.
Id. at 14.
4 One study describes these offenses as
curfew regulations, school attendance laws, restrictions on use of alcohol and
tobacco; and children variously designated as beyond control, ungovernable, in-
corrigible, runaway, or in need of supervision - according to national juvenile
court statistics, the latter two groups account for over 25 percent of the total
number of delinquent children appearing before children's courts and between
25 and 30 percent of the population of state institutions for delinquent children.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 4 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.02 (Page Supp. 1974), wherein a "delinquent child" is de-
fined as any child:
(A) Who violates any law of this state, the United States, or any ordinance or
regulation of a political subdivision of the state, which would be a crime if com-
mitted by an adult (except traffic offenses);
(B) Who violates any lawful order of the court made under this chapter.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (Page Supp. 1974), wherein an "unruly child" is de-
fined as including any child:
(A) Who does not subject himself to the reasonable control of his parents,
teachers, guardian, or custodian, by reason of being wayward or habitually dis-
obedient;
(B) Who is an habitual truant from home or school;
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diction over the noncriminal misconduct of children. While the result of
some of the revisions was to achieve compliance with certain constitu-
tional due process requirements, the total effect was to create further
constitutional infirmities. The analysis and development of these consti-
tutional challenges is the primary concern of this paper.
7
This article will focus on the constitutional defects of juvenile court
adjudications under Ohio juvenile law. The arguments presented, how-
ever, are equally applicable in other jurisdictions since every state has
some type of legislation granting juvenile court jurisdiction over both
criminal s and noncriminal 9 misconduct of children.
I. BACKGROUND AND ISSUES
Under Ohio law the juvenile courts may obtain jurisdiction over a
misbehaving youngster by finding him either delinquent or unruly.
The first paragraph of the delinquency statute narrowly defines as de-
linquent those children that commit acts which would be violations of
the criminal laws if committed by adults. 10 The second paragraph,
however, extends the juvenile court's delinquency jurisdiction to children
who merely violate lawful orders of the court." At least nine other states
have similar provisions,'2 and they have been aptly described as "open-
ended boiler plate clause[s] . . . [extending] jurisdiction as far as any
(C) Who so deports himself as to injure or endanger the health or morals of
himself or others;
(D) Who attempts to enter the marriage relation in any state without the con-
sent of his parents, custodian, legal guardian, or other legal authority;
(E) Who is found in a disreputable place, visits or patronizes a place pro-
hibited by law, or associates with vagrant, vicious, criminal, notorious, or im-
moral persons;
(F) Who engages in an occupation prohibited by law, or is in a situation dan-
gerous to life or limb or injurious to the health or morals of himself or others;
(C) Who has violated a law applicable only to a child.
' For a similar review of the constitutional challenges against noncriminal juvenile
statutes in general see Stiller & Elder, PINS - A Concept In Need of Supervision, 12 Am.
CrIM. L. REV. 33 (1974).
8 A thorough but somewhat outdated review of juvenile legislation in all fifty states can
be found in Comment, "Delinquent Child": A Legal Term Without Meaning, 21 BAYLOR
L. REV. 352 (1969). For examples of delinquency statutes see AIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 8-201(7)-(9) (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-204 (Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 702-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03 (1975).
' The "unruly child" category is variously labeled in other jurisdictions: "Child in Need of
Supervision" [CHINS], CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-103(5) (1975); "Minor Otherwise
in Need of Supervision" [MINS], ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972); and
"Persons in Need of Supervision" [PINS], N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 712 (McKinney Supp.
1974).
'0 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.02(A) (Page Supp. 1974). See note 5 supra, for text of the
statute.
1 Id. § 2151.02(B).
12 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-201(8), (9) (Supp. 1973); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602
(West Supp. 1975); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-103(9)(1Il) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-53(f) (1975); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24A-401(e)(2), (f) (Supp. 1974); MONT. REV.
CODEs ANN. § 10-1203(12)(b) (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040(1)(c)(2) (1973);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(2) (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(b)(1) (Supp.
1974).
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court might want."' 3  The unruly section 4 contains prohibitions against
the usual vague and uncertain child-only crimes of habitual truancy from
home or school,' 5 disobediance to parents or teachers, 16 "immoral"
conduct 7 and associating with "immoral" persons.'
8
The constitutional challenges that can be made against these statutes
are several. One of the major defects of the lawful order and unruly
sections is that they are invalid based on traditional constitutional
grounds of vagueness and overbreadth.' 9 Other challenges involve the
denial of various procedural due process protections at the trial stage of
juvenile proceedings (the adjudicatory hearing). The case of In re Gault0
applied certain procedural due process protections to delinquency ad-
judications. These essentials of due process include adequate, timely,
written notice of the charges in all cases, the right to counsel, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses in all cases where the juvenile is in danger of loss of
liberty through commitment. 2' The evidentiary standard of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt is also applicable to the adjudicatory stage of
delinquency proceedings.2 2  In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,2 3 however,
the Supreme Court declined to extend to delinquents the right to trial by
jury.24
Although the drafters of the Ohio Juvenile Code and the Ohio Rules
of Juvenile Procedure are to be commended for extending the rights enu-
merated in Gault equally to delinquency and unruly adjudicatory hear-
ings, 25 there is a distinction under Ohio law between the two classifi-
cations as to the required quantum of proof. In compliance with In re
'3 Willey, supra note 1, at 163.
'4 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (Page Supp. 1974). See note 6 supra, for text of the
statute.
15 Id. § 2151.022(B).
16 Id. § 2151.022(A).
17 Id. § 2151.022(C), (E), (F).
id. § 2151.022(E).
'9 For similar reviews of constitutional challenges to juvenile statutes based on vagueness
and overbreadth, see Stiller & Elder, supra note 7, at 45-52; Note, Parens Patriae and
Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745 (1973); Comment, Juve-
nile Statutes and Noncriminal Delinquents: Applying the Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine,
4 SETON HALL L. REV. 184 (1972); Comment, Statutory Vagueness in juvenile Law: The
Supreme Court and Mattiello v. Connecticut, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 143 (1969).
20 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21 Id.
22 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
23 403 U.S. 258 (1971).
24 Id. Ohio has not extended the right to trial by jury to juveniles. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.35 (Page Supp. 1974); OHio R. Juv. P. 27.
25 The juvenile's right to notice of the specific charge brought against him is set out in
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27 (Page Supp. 1974) and OHIO R. Juv. P. 15(A). Under
Ohio law the juvenile also has the right to retained or appointed counsel. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (Page Supp. 1974) and OsHIo R. Juv. P. 4(A). Juveniles may
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.314 (Page Supp. 1974) and OH-o R. Juv. P. 7(F)(2), 29(B)(5). The juvenile rules
also grant the right of confrontation and cross-examination. OHIO R. JUv. P. 29(B)(5).
[Vol. 24:602
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WinshipM6 the Rules provide for proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
delinquency proceedings, but permit determinations of unruliness based
on mere "clear and convincing evidence."2 Noncriminal unruly and law-
ful order delinquency adjudications are open to constitutional attack when
the same due process protections are not afforded at every adjudicatory
stage leading to commitment. The premise of such challenges is the
similarity in treatment by the juvenile court of both delinquent and unruly
children.
Even though Ohio law presently differentiates only between unruly
and delinquency adjudications with regard to the burden of proof, con-
stitutional challenges based on this distinction are significant and timely
since the division of delinquency and unruly jurisdiction into separate
categories makes possible additional due process distinctions in the
future between the two types of proceedings. Although the Supreme
Court has not held that all of the procedural guarantees available in
adult criminal trials apply to juvenile delinquency adjudications, 28
commentators continue to argue for the extension of certain fundamen-
tal rights.29 It is reasonable to expect that some of these arguments will
prevail in the future.30 Therefore, the potential broadening of due pro-
cess protections to delinquent juveniles increases the importance of wag-
ing constitutional attacks against findings of unruliness or delinquency
where full delinquency due process protections were not afforded at any
hearing when the alleged misconduct of the child was in issue.
In addition to the full development of the due process arguments out-
26 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
27 OHIO R. JUV. P. 29(E)(4). This rule undoubtedly supplants the now unconstitutional
code provision which allowed delinquency and unruly issues to be determined by clear
and convincing evidence, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page Supp. 1974).
28 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967); Kent
v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). See also Dorsen & Reznick, In re Gault and
the Future of Juvenile Law, I FAM. L. Q. 1, 3-8 (1967).
29 For a detailed refutation of the reasoning in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971) see 70 MicH. L. REV. 171 (1971). For discussions of the right to a jury trial in
juvenile proceedings, see Katz, Juveniles Committed to Penal Institutions - Do They
Have the Right to a Jury Trial?, 13 J. FAM. L. 675 (1973-74); Note, Juvenile Right to
Jury Trial - Post McKeiver, 1971 WASH. U. L. Q. 605; Comment, Juries for Juveniles
- A Rehabilitative Tool, 11 J. FAM. L. 107 (1971-72); Comment, No Constitutional
Right to Trial by Jury for juveniles in Delinquency Proceedings, 56 MINN. L. REv. 249
(1971). For discussions of the right to bail in juvenile proceedings see Note, Right to Bail
For Juveniles, 48 CH.-KENr L. REV. 99 (1971); Comment, Juvenile Right to Bail, 11
J. FAM. L. 81 (1971-72); Comment, A Juvenile's Right To Bail In Oregon, 47 OnE. L.
REV. 194 (1968). For a discussion of the use of social records (hearsay) in juvenile pro-
ceedings see Frey & Bubany, Pre-Adjudication Review of The Social Record in juve-
nile Court: A Low-Visibility Obstacle To A Fair Process, 12 J. FAM. L. 391 (1972-73);
Comment, Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings In Ohio: Due Process and the Hearsay
Dilemma, 24 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 356 (1975). For a survey of all of the due process rights
available in juvenile court proceedings see Popkin, Lippert & Keiter, Another Look At
The Role of Due Process In Juvenile Court, 6 FAM. L. Q. 233 (1972).
30 The Supreme Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971), recom-
mended that each state determine whether a jury trial is desirable in some or all juve-
nile cases. At least one state has held that under its constitution the right to a trial by
jury is available in a delinquency proceeding whenever the child is charged with an act
which would be a crime if committed by an adult. R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 32-33
(Alas. 1971). See also Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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lined above, brief mention will be made of potential but less viable
arguments under the equal protection clause.
II. VAGUENESS AND OVERBMEADTH
One of the fundamental principles of American criminal law is that
no conduct or form of expression may be criminally proscribed unless it
is precisely described in a penal law. 31 This principle is commonly ex-
pressed as the "rule of law" or the "principle of legality" which imposes
a definite limitation on the power of the state to punish conduct without
ascertainable rules proscribing such conduct.32 American courts gener-
ally apply the principle of legality by examining statutes on their face
for vagueness or overbreadth. 33
There have been few divergencies from the principle of legality in the
Western World in the past several hundred years. 34 Notable exceptions,
of course, have been laws regarding juveniles, vagrants and persons de-
scribed as "without visible means of support."35  But in the case of
vagrants and disorderly persons the Supreme Court has repeatedly de-
manded statutory specificity by striking down laws attempting to pro-
scribe the vagrancy status or disorderly conduct in imprecise terms.3
The historical rationale for ignoring the principle of legality in juve-
31 J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 28 (2d ed. 1960).
32 Id. at 27-28. In Europe the principle of legality is usually called nulla poena sine lege
which can be expressed as "no person may be punished except in pursuance of a
statute which prescribes a penalty." Id. at 28. The principle can also be employed
narrowly as nullum crimen sine lege which means "that no conduct may be held
criminal unless it is precisely described in a penal law." Id. It is this narrow defini-
tion which is applicable to a consideration of the constitutionality of American penal
statutes. Id. at 41-44.
31 Id. at 42-44.
34 The only notable divdrgences from the principle of legality in the Western World within
the present century occurred under totalitarian regimes. The Russian Penal Code of
1926 provided:
A crime is any socially dangerous act or omission which threatens the founda-
tions of the Soviet political structure and that system of law which has been
established by the Workers' and Peasants' Government for the period of transi-
tion to a Communist structure.
Id. at 48-49.
The German Act of June 28, 1935 provided:
Any person who commits an act which the law declares to be punishable or
which is deserving of penalty according to the fundamental conceptions of a
penal law and sound popular feeling, shall be punished. If there is no penal law
directly covering an act it shall be punished under the law of which the funda-
mental conception applies most nearly to the said act.
Id. at 48. In Anglo-American history the most recent abandonment of the principle of
legality was the English Star Chamber which was abolished in 1641. Id. at 52-53.
35 Id. at 54. See also Lacy, Vagrancy and other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV.
L. REv. 1203 (1953); Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINcs L. J. 237 (1958).
3 For vagrancy statutes invalidated see Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544
(1971). For reversals of convictions under disorderly conduct statutes proscribing ex-
pression variously described as "opprobrious" or "abusive," see Lewis v. New Orleans,
415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
[Vol. 24:602
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nile law3 7 was that the objective of such laws was treatment and re-
habilitation rather than criminal punishment.3 8 The behavioral theory
that conduct is caused and can, therefore, be treated 9 provided the
impetus for this rehabilitative rationale. The treatment ideal has been
used not only to justify vague juvenile statutes40 but it has been used
as the rationale for denying juveniles full criminal due process protec-
tions4' and has provided the underlying theoretical justification for
juvenile court jurisdiction over a wide variety of noncriminal forms of
juvenile misconduct.42
The usual argument made in support of vague and broad juvenile
statutes is that they facilitate early intervention, thereby allowing the
rehabilitative services of the juvenile court to work their preventive in-
3' For discussions of the history and philosophy of the juvenile court movement, see In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1967); TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-40; Fox,
Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970);
Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966
SuP. CT. REV. 167.
31 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966). The rehabilitative rationale has
formed the basis for sustaining imprecise statutory grants of juvenile court jurisdiction
over noncriminal conduct in several states. See, e.g., E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970); Connecticut v. Mattiello, 4
Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (App. Div. 1966).
a McNulty, The Right To Be Left Alone, 12 J. FAM. L. 229, 230 (1972-1973). The
behaviorist theory is reflected in a famous quotation from the comments of an early
juvenile court judge:
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or girl committed
a specific wrong, but what is he, how has he become what he is, and what had
best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a
downward career.
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119-120 (1909). The behaviorist
influence was, of course, not limited to juvenile law. The treatment rationale was also
responsible for the movement for indeterminate sentences for particular kinds of adult
offenses. J. HALL, supra note 31, at 56.
40 McNulty, supra note 39, at 230-31. Hall commented on this influence in criminal law
as follows:
In addition, the argument occasionally extends to advocacy of the entire elimina-
tion of the requirement that there be any definite criminal conduct, i.e. of
nullum crimen as well as nulla poena. "Anti-social" persons would in some sort
of proceeding be declared "dangerous" and placed in the hands of experts, to be
dealt with as they determined in accordance with their views or knowledge of
psychiatry and sociology.
J. HALL, supra note 31, at 56.
41 One of the earliest cases invoking the doctrine of parens patriae and the rehabilitative
rationale for affirming denial of procedural due process protections to juveniles was
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905):
To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing in a career of
crime, to end in maturer years in public punishment and disgrace, the Legis-
lature surely may provide for the salvation of such a child . ..by bringing it
into one of the courts of the state without any process at all, for the purpose of
subjecting it to the state's guardianship and protection ...
Id. at 53, 62 A. at 200. This reasoning was repeated fifty years later in the often cited
case of In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954). For more recent reiterations,
see Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 254 N.E.2d 319 (1970); In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 191
S.E.2d 702 (1972). A general discussion of this issue may be found in M. PAULSEN &
C. WHrrIEBREA, supra note 3, at 2-6.
42 THE PRESmENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SoCIErY 81 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE
CHALLENGE].
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fluences before the crime-prone child becomes established in a life of
crime. 43 The validity of this argument, however, depends upon the truth
of its underlying premise - that the juvenile court process is and can be
rehabilitative.
The Supreme Court has specifically noted that the performance of
the juvenile court in effective individualized treatment and rehabilita-
tion has not measured up to its theoretical purpose."4 The 1967 Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
found not only that the juvenile court had failed to rehabilitate but that
it had not succeeded significantly in even stemming the tide of delin-
quency.45  The high rate of recidivism reported among delinquents46
highlights the court's failure to achieve its rehabilitative goals. Further-
more, several analysts have indicated that in some cases the juvenile
court process actually reinforces delinquent behavior. 47
While recognizing that insufficient resources and inadequate facilities
are a problem, the President's Commission rejected the argument that
an infusion of resources would enable the juvenile courts to fulfill the
expectations surrounding their creation. 48 The Commission instead struck
a blow to behaviorist theories by noting that we are little able with present
knowledge to predict or prevent delinquency:
What research is making increasingly clear is that delinquency
is not so much an act of individual deviancy as a pattern of be-
havior produced by a multitude of pervasive societal influences
well beyond the reach of the actions of any judge, probation of-
ficer, correctional counselor, or psychiatrist.49
The United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected the "seeds of
antisocial behavior theory" in a case involving an adult vagrancy stat-
ute.50 Mr. Justice Douglas writing for a unanimous court dismissed the
notion that certain forms of noncriminal behavior are conducive of later
criminality and therefore must be subject to proscription at an early stage.
1 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-23.
14 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56
(1966).
s THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, at 80.
41 Figures range from one-third of all delinquency cases nationally, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 23, to seventy percent of those discharged from parole in one year
in California, Gough, The Beyond-Control Child and the Right to Treatment: An
Exercise in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. Louis L. REV. 182, 191 (1972) citing
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONS AGENCY, THE ORGANIZATION OF
STATE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES IN THE CONTROL AND TREATMENT OF CRIME AND DE-
LINQUENCY 56 (1967).
4 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 23.
48 THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42.
41 Id. As the belief that we can neither prevent nor predict delinquency is increasingly
accepted, some observers have advocated alternative methods for dealing with the
problem. See Garriott, The Use of Recreation in Treating Juvenile Delinquency, 25
JUv. JUST. 56 (1974); Strattan, Crisis Intervention Counseling & Police Diversion from
the Juvenile Justice System: A Review of the Literature, 25 Juv. JusT. 44 (1974).
50 Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). See Note, Parens Patriae and
Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745 (1973).
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He found that the implicit presumption of the challenged statutes - that
crime was being "nipped in the bud" by the arrest of persons who loiter
or are suspicious looking to the police - was "too precarious for a rule
of law." 5
1
It would appear, then, that the underlying premise of vague and broad
juvenile statutes is equally invalid. If the juvenile court process is not
rehabilitative and if the connection between certain forms of noncriminal
youthful misconduct and future criminality is tenuous at best, there is
no justification for denying juveniles the due process protection of statu-
tory precision in any laws which subject them to a potential loss of
liberty. Indeed, these, as all criminal laws, should be scrutinized under
the constitutional doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth.
A. Void For Vagueness
In a leading case invalidating a statute on vagueness grounds the
Supreme Court held that the terms of the statute were "so vague, indef-
inite and uncertain that it must be condemned as repugnant to the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. '" 52 Therefore, the principle
of legality restricting the exercise of the state's power to punish in the
absence of specific statutory proscriptions also prohibits vague statutes. 53
The test of statutory vagueness will be met and the first essential of
due process is violated when the statute in question
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. .... 54
Thus, constitutional challenges based on statutory vagueness generally
allege inadequate notice and insufficient guidelines. 55
51 Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972). See Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939).
In response to the idea that delinquency can be prevented, a consultant to the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice has said:
This belief rests upon uncritical conceptions that there are substantive behaviors,
isometric in nature, which precede delinquency, much like prodromal signs of the
onset of disease .... Social science research and current theory in social
psychology refute the idea that there are fixed, inevitable sequences in de-
linquent or criminal careers. As yet no behavior patterns or personality ten-
dencies have been isolated and shown to be antecedents of delinquency, and it
is unlikely that they will be.
Lemert, The Juvenile Court - Quest and Realities, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
4, at 91, 93. For an analysis of the validity of the prediction studies of Sheldon and
Eleanor Glueck in predicting juvenile delinquency on the basis of social, economic and
cultural factors see Weis, The Glueck Social Prediction Table - An Unfulfilled Promise,
65 J. CRM. L. & C. 397 (1974) wherein the author concluded that the Glueck Social
Prediction Table is not validated by the empirical data.
51 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939).
53 J. HALL, supra note 31, at 42-44.
54 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
-5 Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 96 (1948). See Stiller & Elder, supra note 7, at 47.
1975]
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss4/3
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
1. Inadequate Notice
The fourteenth amendment due process requirement that statutes give
persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice that their contemplated con-
duct is forbidden has been reaffirmed recently by the Supreme Court in
several cases voiding vagrancy statutes. The challenged statutes used a
variety of imprecise terms to describe a forbidden status or conduct such
as "without any visible or lawful business ,"' 56 "conduct annoying to per-
sons passing by,"57 and "rouges, vagabonds and dissolute persons. '" 58
The Court held in each case that the particular proscription failed to
provide fair notice that the particular conduct was forbidden thereby
violating the principle that "no man shall be held criminally responsible
for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed."5 9
It is clear, then, that adults could never be penalized for violating
statutes containing such broad language as that of the lawful order sec-
tion and much of the unruly section of the Ohio Juvenile Code. A law
prohibiting juvenile conduct that may "injure or endanger the health or
morals" of the child or others"0 is not unlike the invalid adult statutes
penalizing vagrancy. 61 A statute which permits an adjudication of de-
linquency for violation of "any lawful order of the court"62 makes the
invalid vagrancy statutes seem like models of precision and clarity.
The Supreme Court has not held specifically that the fair warning
requirement is applicable to juvenile law. One point of view is that tradi-
tional vagueness concepts apply only to criminal statutes and since ju-
venile proceedings are civil in nature, no challenge for vagueness is ap-
propriate.6 3 A recent federal district court decision rejected this argu-
ment. In Gonzalez v. Mailliard,64 the court invalidated a California
statute which granted juvenile court jurisdiction over children who were
"in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life."6 5  In
5' Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
57 Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
5' Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
5' Palmer v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 546 (1971).
60 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022(B) (Page Supp. 1974). See note 6 supra, for text of
the statute.
61 The "vagrancy" statute analogy was used by the federal district court in Gonzalez v.
Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated on jurisdictional grounds,
94 S. Ct. 1915 (1974), striking down a California juvenile statute on grounds of vague-
ness and overbreadth.
62 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.02(B) (Page Supp. 1974).
' See the state's argument in Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971),
vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 94 S. Ct. 1915 (1974). For an opinion in accord with
the state's contention see Connecticut v. Mattiello, 4 Conn. Cir. 55, 62, 225 A.2d 507,
511 (Cir. Ct. App. 1966). See the discussion of the "civil" label argument in Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
64 No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 94 S. Ct. 1915
(1974).
6 The entire language of the California code challenged is:
Any person under the age of 18 years who persistently or habitually refuses to
obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his parents, guardian,
custodian or school authorities, or who is beyond the control of such person, or
any person who is a habitual truant from school within the meaning of any law
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rejecting the state's claim that vagueness arguments do not apply to
civil statutes, the court noted first that the Supreme Court has held that
vagueness may be a constitutional infirmity in civil as well as criminal
statutes.66
The court further reasoned that a statute cannot escape constitutional
scrutiny merely because it is labeled "civil" in nature. What must be
considered is the effect of the statute. The tests to determine whether
a statute is not truly civil are whether there is the potential for loss of
the accused's liberty67 and whether a stigma attaches when a violation
of the statute is found.6 8  Although under California law no direct com-
of this state, or who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute,
lewd, or immoral life, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may
adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1972). A 1974 amendment deleted the words
"or school authorities" and "who is a habitual truant from school within the meaning of
any law of this state." CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1975).
66 See Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 at 8 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated on
jurisdictional grounds, 94 S. Ct. 1915 (1974). The court relied on four cases to support
this proposition: Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Jordan v. DeGeorge,
341 U.S. 223 (1951); Small v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925);
Bonnie v. Gladden, 400 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1964).
17 Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated on jurisdictional
grounds, 94 S. Ct. 1915 (1974).
Whatever label be given the 1860 Act, there is no doubt that it provides the State
with a procedure for depriving an acquitted defendant of his liberty and his
property. Both liberty and property are specifically protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against any state deprivation which does not meet the standards of
due process, and this protection is not to be avoided by the simple label a State
chooses to fasten upon its conduct or its statute. So here this state Act whether
labeled "penal" or not must meet the challenge that it is unconstitutionally
vague.
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966).
In Gault the Supreme Court rejected the notion that due process could be denied in
juvenile proceedings because of the "feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-of-con-
venience." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967). See Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp.
371, 376-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972) (the three judge federal
district court rejected the notion that New York's "wayward minor" statute which
permitted incarceration of juveniles in adult criminal institutions was a nonpenal
statute under which the state exercised its power to act as parens patriae). For further
discussion of the Gesicki case and its application to juvenile statutes see Comment,
Juvenile Statutes and Noncriminal Delinquents: Applying the Void-For-Vagueness
Doctrine, 4 SErON HALL L. REV. 184 (1972). See E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1969) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970):
Rather than relying on differences in nomenclature and the civil-criminal di-
chotomy, it would be a sounder approach to attach significance to the serious-
ness of the matter which is at stake in determining whether the statute will
survive a vagueness attack. Under our statute a child of ten may be deprived
of his liberty for a period of eleven years. Appellant here faces confinement
for almost seven years. To insist on greater definiteness in a statute imposing a
$5.00 fine than in one imposing such confinement as a sanction, and to defend
such distinction on the ground that the statute imposing the fine is a criminal
enactment while the statute imposing the confinement is civil in nature, is to
ignore reality.
Id. at 228 (footnotes omitted).
Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated on jurisdictional
grounds, 94 S. Ct. 1915 (1974). There the court noted that the adverse stigma attached
to a noncriminal juvenile adjudication is no less than that of an adjudication for commis-
sion of a criminal act.
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mitment to a state juvenile institution is authorized for children found
to be unruly,69 the potential for deprivation of freedom is similar to
that for juveniles who have committed crimes. The potential exists be-
cause of an escalator clause identical to Ohio's lawful order section.
70
A child violating any lawful court order can be committed to a maximum
security Youth Authority institution and thus commingled with children
who have committed criminal acts.
7
'
The Gonzalez court equated with adult penal institutions not only the
Youth Authority institutions, but also the "low security" county juvenile
homes and camps, by holding that the loss of liberty in these facilities
was the same as that in adult prisons.72 Therefore, when a statute sub-
jects juveniles to deprivations similar to those imposed upon convicted
adults, the statute cannot escape judicial scrutiny merely because the
state has labeled it noncriminal and rehabilitative in purpose.
Statutory clarity is particularly essential if the procedural rights man-
dated by the Supreme Court are to be preserved. The fair warning re-
quirement breathes life into due process guarantees while vagueness
makes those guarantees meaningless.7 3 The concern for protection of
procedural rights underscored the decision in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,
4
which declared unconstitutional a statute assessing costs of prosecution
upon a criminal defendant for being "guilty of some misconduct." Mr.
Justice Black, speaking for the Court said:
It would be difficult if not impossible for a person to prepare a
defense against such general abstract charges as "misconduct"
or "reprehensible misconduct."
75
The Gonzalez court quoted the above remarks and commented further
stressing the danger to juvenile procedural rights from vague statutes:
It is no easier to defend against charges that one is "in danger
of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life." Of what
possible utility is notice of charges when the charge is merely
that onc is "dissolute"? What use is counsel when it is impos-
sible to know what type of evidence is relevant to rebuttal of the
prosecution case?76
Application of the fair warning requirement to the lawful order sec-
tion reveals the same difficulties. Of what possible utility is notice of
charges to a child that he has violated a lawful order of the court? How
" CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1975). Children adjudicated within
the provisions of section 601 may be committed to county juvenile homes or camps.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 730 (West 1972).
70 CAL. VELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1975).
71 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 731 (West 1972).
72 Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 at 9 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated on jurisdictional
grounds, 94 S. Ct. 1915 (1974).
73 Id.
74 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
7- Id. at 404.
7 Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 at 11 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated on jurisdic-
tional grounds, 94 S. Ct. 1915 (1974).
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is counsel to prepare a defense against such a broad, undefined charge?
What type of evidence will be necessary to rebut such a charge? What
is a lawful order? The dictionary definition adds little clarity. The
word "lawful" is defined as "in conformity with the principles of the
law" and as "permitted by law.17 7  But what orders are "in conformity
with the principles of the law?" What is a violation of a lawful order?
If a child has been ordered by a judge to "obey" his parents or to be home
at a certain hour, is the child in violation of a lawful order if he stays
away from home beyond the appointed hour because his parents are
fighting or are intoxicated and he fears abuse? Thus, the lawful order
section hardly provides fair warning to children subject to court orders.
Several subsections of the unruly section are also unconstitutionally
vague. Sections (C), (E), and (F) contain prohibitions against conduct,
associations and occupations that are "dangerous" or "injurious" to the
"morals" of the child or others. 78  While "dangerous" and "injurious"
are imprecise terms, the principal source of uncertainty arises from the
use of the word "morals." Its application requires subjective judgment
and questions of degree beyond the comprehension of a child ten or
even fourteen years of age. 79  It would seem that these three sections
are similar to that challenged in Gonzalez, and that they therefore share
the same constitutional infirmities of the California statute.
8 0
Language identical to that of Section (C) was upheld by the Texas
Court of Appeals."' There the court reasoned that although the statute
was general in its terms the rights of the child were protected because
the statute required that specific acts or conduct be alleged in the peti-
tion. The requirement of specificity in the complaint, however, does not
cure a vague statute. The Supreme Court has stated that:
If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due
process clause, specifications of details of the offense intended
to be charged would not serve to validate it. It is the statute,
not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to govern
conduct and warns against transgression.
82
Further, it must be noted that the Texas case was decided prior to the
Supreme Court's application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to va-
grancy statutes.8 3  Therefore, the Texas court's assertion that the
vagueness doctrine has been limited in use by the Supreme Court to
7 EBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICrIONARY (2d College ed. 1970).
78 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (Page Supp. 1974), see note 6 supra, for full text of
sections (C), (E), and (F).
79 E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225, 229-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
80 Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 at I (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated on jurisdictional
grounds, 94 S. Ct. 1915 (1974).
81 E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956
(1970). The specific language of the challenged Texas statute defined a delinquent
child as one who "habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or
health of himself or others." Id. at 226.
s2 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
13 See note 36 supra and corresponding text.
19751
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss4/3
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
first amendment protections of expression8 4 is no longer true. The
doctrine is now clearly applicable to prohibitions against conduct such as
that proscribed by the unruly section.
The absurdity of the use of vague terms such as "morals" is apparent
from a closer consideration of Section (E) which prohibits associating
with "vagrant, vicious, criminal, notorious, or immoral persons. 8 5
Does this section imply that a child can be adjudicated unruly for as-
sociating with his mother who may be a prostitute or for associating
with his mother's friends or business associates?8 6  The same question
arises from the use of the terms "vicious," "criminal" and "notorious."
Can a child be charged with "unruliness" for associating with his father
who may be a wanted felon or a notorious racketeer or for associating
with his father's friends or business associates? These questions suggest
only some degree of the bewilderment experienced by those who must
determine the meaning of statutes such as these. One commentator
has described them as being "without definable limits understandable to
a child, attorney or judge. 8 7
2. Insufficient Guidelines
Due process also requires that statutes must provide adequate guide-
lines to prevent arbitrary enforcement and to guide courts in trying those
who stand accused under the statutes.8 8 This principle was recently
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Papachristou v. Jacksonville,8 9
wherein a vagrancy ordinance was held unconstitutional because it en-
couraged arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions."0
The essence of a constitutional attack under the inadequate guidelines
concept is that the excessive discretionary power granted to courts by
broad juvenile laws is an unlawful delegation of legislative authority in
violation of the separation of powers principle.9 1 Broad delegations of
discretionary power to nonjudicial agencies are generally approved by
leading authorities in administrative law,92 and the Supreme Court has
84 E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d at 225 n.1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
956 (1970).
15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022(E) (Page Supp. 1974); see note 8 supra, for full text
of the statute.
16 See Comment, Delinquent Child: A Legal Term Without Meaning, 21 BAYLOR L. REV.
352 (1969).
87 Willey, supra note 1, at 165.
88 Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948).
89 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
90 Id. at 162. See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972):
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws
must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law im-
permissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application.
Id. at 108-09 (footnotes omitted). See also Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 383 U.S. 399,402-03 (1966).
81 See 011O CONST. art. 2, 9 1. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT
§§ 2.01-.10 (3rd ed. 1972).
92 K. DAvIs, supra note 91, at § 2.05.
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sustained such delegations to federal rule-making agencies even though
meaningful standards were not spelled out in the statutes.93  A com-
pelling need for delegated power without limitation may be shown where
the subject requiring regulation presents issues of such complexity as to
be beyond the expertise of most legislators."4
The defense of broad discretion in juvenile courts rests on a variation
of the rehabilitative rationale involving concepts similar to those ad-
vanced under administrative law principles. Since early intervention into
the lives of misbehaving children is seen by proponents of broad statutes
as necessary to prevent future criminal activity, 95 only unrestricted ju-
dicial discretion is believed to provide the flexibility thought necessary
to effectuate the court's involvement in an unpredictable variety of
youthful misconduct. 96  Thus, if statutes are too narrowly defined the
child's conduct might not subject him to the court's benevolent jurisdic-
tion. It is thought necessary, then, to draft juvenile legislation that
gives courts administrative discretion to apply whatever definition to de-
linquency they choose.9 7
The sanctioning of broad discretion in juvenile court judges under
administrative law principles, however, fails in analogy upon considera-
tion of important distinctions in the nature and operation of juvenile
law. First, the very fact of the juvenile court's jurisdiction over non-
criminal behavior of children is strongly challenged on the grounds of
misuse of the jurisdiction to appease angry parents and the lack of re-
habilitative success. 98 The chance of providing meaningful assistance to
a few troubled children is seriously outweighed by the harm done to
many children by the juvenile court experience itself.99 Therefore, the
need for this type of legislation is not as compelling as that delegating
authority to regulatory agencies.
Secondly, legislators are probably as competent as juvenile court
judges to determine precisely what specific types of behavior should come
within the court's jurisdiction. Although legislators are not trained
child psychologists, neither are most juvenile court judges. Furthermore,
as noted previously, even sociologists and psychologists have not been
able to determine the precise causes of delinquency or the means to
prevent it.
Thirdly, the approval of broad administrative delegations is not
without strong emphasis on the need for accompanying safeguards to
prevent arbitrary action and abuse of discretion, the protection coming
not from legislative standards but from procedural safeguards. 100 Juve-
13 K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JusTicE 44-45 (1969).
91 Id. at 38-39.
'5 TASK FoacE REPORT, supra note 4, at 22-23.
9 McNulty, supra note 39, at 230-31.
97 ld.
98 Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383, 1394
(1974).
9 Id. at 1407. See TASK FORC E REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
100 K. DAVIS, supra note 91, at § 2.03.
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nile court proceedings, however, lack many fundamental procedural due
process protections. In Ohio, a child may be adjudicated unruly based
on mere clear and convincing evidence. 10 1 Juveniles are not entitled to
trial by jury,102 and it is reportedly common practice for juvenile court
judges to have access to prejudicial hearsay evidence in the form of
probation reports and social histories at the adjudication hearing. 10 3
The important safeguards, therefore, that should accompany broad
delegations of administrative authority are not available in most juvenile
courts at the present stage of juvenile law development.
In the absence of procedural formality the unbridled discretion per-
mitted by omnibus statutory language, no matter how benevolently
motivated, tends to result in arbitrariness. 10 4 The situation presents the
danger of judicial overreach through imposition of the judge's own code
of youthful conduct. 10 5 The power of a prosecutor or judge to put what-
ever meaning he chooses into terms like "lawful order," "dangerous,"
"injurious," "morals," or "immoral" and to enforce such determinations
against unsuspecting citizens is an arbitrary power that is inconsistent
with sound government.l
The grant of discretionary power under the lawful order and the
unruly sections goes far beyond the broadest recommendations in the
field of administrative law. The vague language of these statutes in-
vites arbitrary application and fails to provide fair warning to those sub-
ject to the statutes' penalties. There is no reasonable justification for
not extending to children the same fundamental fairness to which adults
facing criminal charges are entitled under the vagueness doctrine.
B. Overbreadth
The first amendment rights of free speech and association are appli-
cable to young people as well as adults. 0 7 The lawful order section and
certain clauses of the unruly section are unconstitutionally overbroad be-
cause they fail to specify the nature of the proscribed conduct and thus may
be employed to punish constitutionally protected behavior.i °  These sec-
tions may be construed to encompass a variety of acts, associations, and
expressions that fall within the ambit of first amendment protection.
Protective statutes prohibiting immoral and endangering conduct'0 9 can
'0' OHIO R. Juv. P. 29(E)(4).
102 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page Supp. 1974).
103 Comment, Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings in Ohio: Due Process and the Hearsay
Dilemma, 24 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 356, 362-64 (1975).
104 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967).
105 TASK FoncE REPORT, supra note 4, at 25; see E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225, 231-32
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
100 Cf. K. DAVIs, supra note 93, at 78 (criticizing certain regulations issued by public
housing agencies restricting tenancy to "desirable" tenants in vague terms).
'0 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
10s See Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972); Stiller & Elder, supra note 7, at
51-53.
'0' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022(C), (E), (F) (Page Supp. 1974), see note 6 supra, for
full text of the statute.
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be used as a means of enforcing conformity" and suppressing youthful
involvement in various forms of political and social protest.
The state may have a legitimate interest in preventing certain forms
of conduct such as truancy and the excessive use of alcohol or drugs
which, although not proscribed for adults, might be detrimental to the
welfare of children."' The Supreme Court has said, however, that the
state may not attempt to achieve legitimate ends through the enactment
of unnecessarily broad statutes which invade the area of protected free-
doms." 2  Where less drastic means will achieve the same purpose the
state may not ignore the demands of personal liberty."13  Recent legisla-
tion in Texas and Illinois demonstrates that juvenile statutes can be drawn
more narrowly and with greater specificity. Juvenile court jurisdiction
over noncriminal behavior is narrowly confined in Texas to truants and
permanent runaways" 4 and in Illinois it is limited to truants, drug ad-
dicts, and children beyond the control of their parents." 5
We may not want to abandon all hopes for eventual accomplishment
of some of the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile court," 6 but potential
achievements do not justify abandonment of fundamental fairness." 7
Although we might applaud workable programs of treatment and crime
prevention, the rule of law, as possibly the greatest achievement of
Western political experience, cannot be ignored."'
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Adjudications under Ohio's unruly and lawful order sections may be
constitutionally deficient under a variety of circumstances involving
the denial of full delinquent procedural due process protections. Four
basic problems arise. First, children adjudicated unruly based on any
type of underlying act, noncriminal or criminal, may be subjected to the
same treatment as delinquents who have committed criminal acts with-
out the same due process protections. Second, there is the potential
to circumvent the due process rights guaranteed to juveniles charged
with violating criminal laws by finding them unruly for such behavior.
Third, children adjudicated unruly on the basis of noncriminal conduct
can be institutionally commingled with criminally delinquent children.
Fourth, the charge of unruliness may be escalated to delinquency on
the basis of a mere noncriminal probation violation.
"1o TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 25.
"' Stiller & Elder, supra note 7, at 52.
II See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
113 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
114 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03 (1975). See note 183 infra, for full text of the statute.
115 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-2, -3 (Smith-Hurd 1972). See note 182 infra, for full
text of the statute.
116 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
117 For a discussion of the void-for-vagueness argument in the analytical framework of
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, id., see Note, Parens Patriae and Statutory Vagueness in the
Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745, 758-71 (1973).
11 J. HALL, supra note 31, at 58.
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A. Potential for Subjection of Unruly Child to
Same Treatment as Delinquent Child
The decisions in Gault and Winship involved delinquency adjudications
where the child was charged with committing a criminal act and faced
possible incarceration in a state institution.11 9 These holdings, however,
should also apply to adjudications of unruliness because the unruly child
and the delinquent child are equally victimized by the informal process
in the juvenile court and also face similar treatment under Ohio law.
1. Informal Process
The "benevolent social theory"'20 of juvenile law rests on the premise
that since children are to receive care and protection from the juvenile
court, procedural due process protections available to adults in criminal
trials are not needed nor are they appropriate in juvenile court proceed-
ings.12' Advocates of informality have argued that the procedures of
the adversary system would interfere with the primary task of the juve-
nile court - rehabilitation.2 2
The validity of the informality rationale can be challenged on several
grounds. Not only has the juvenile court process not proved to be re-
habilitative in most cases, 123 but in recent years there also has been evi-
dence that the lack of procedural formality may actually impair rehabilita-
tive efforts.' 24 The decision in Gault was based partly on r .-ognition of
the possible adverse effects of a court procedure totally lacR,.ng in proce-
dural due process protections upon the child's receptiveness to treat-
I" In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 n.1 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
120 See R.L.R. v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alas. 1971) (rejected rehabilitative "benevolent social
theory" as justification for denying due process protections in juvenile courts).
121 Paulsen, Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Courts, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 233.
'22 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 28; Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The
Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 167, 171; M. PAULSEN &
C. WHrrEREAD, supra note 3, at 2-3 (1974).
123 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966):
There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child
receives the worst of both worlds: That he gets neither the protections accorded
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for chil-
dren.
Id. at 556.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) wherein the Supreme Court reasserted its refuta-
tion of the rehabilitative rationale:
The constitutional and theoretical basis for this peculiar system is - to say the
least - debatable. And, in practice, as we remarked in the Kent case, supra,
the results have not been entirely satisfactory.
Id. at 17-18 (footnote omitted).
124 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 31:
[Tlhere has been increasing feeling on the part of sociologists and social welfare
people that the informal procedures, contrary to the original expectation, may
themselves constitute a further obstacle to effective treatment of the delinquent.
The feeling is based in part upon the often observed sense of injustice engen-
dered in the child by seemingly all-powerful and challengeless exercise of
authority by judges and probation officers, based, in the child's eyes, on incon-
sistency, hypocrisy, favoritism, and whimsy.
See generally Lipsit, Due Process as a Gateway to Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice
System, 49 B.U.L. REV. 62, 65 (1969); TASK FORCE REPowr, supra note 4, at 421.
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ment. 25  Also, in the Winship case the Supreme Court specifically re-
jected the argument that formality would destroy any beneficial aspects
of the juvenile court system by noting that use of the reasonable doubt
standard would not affect a state's policies regarding the criminal and
civil effect of delinquency adjudications nor would it affect confidential-
ity, informality, flexibility, or speed of factfinding hearings. Similarily,
procedures distinctive to pre-adjudicatory and dispositional phases of
the juvenile process would remain unimpaired. 26
These same points, then, can be used to extend the full panoply of
due process protections afforded in delinquency adjudications to unruly
adjudications. The lack of rehabilitative success applies equally to chil-
dren brought within the juvenile court's jurisdiction for noncriminal be-
havior. 2 7 The informal process undoubtedly is as detrimental to rehabili-
tative efforts directed to the unruly child as to the delinquent child.
This may be especially true in unruly adjudications under Ohio law
where, because of the clear and convincing standard, 12 there is a greater
likelihood of error in determining whether or not the child has misbe-
baved at all. We can hardly rehabilitate a child who does not need
treatment. 129  Furthermore, any distinctive individualized treatment
courts wish to afford noncriminal unruly children will not be affected by
the requirement of fundamental fairness in trial procedures. The courts
can still differentiate between noncriminal unruly and criminally delin-
quent children in post adjudicatory dispositions and rehabilitative care
programs.
125 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1967). For an analysis of the rejection in Gault of the
informality doctrine, see Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication of the juvenile
Courts, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 233.
126 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1970). The Supreme Court also rejected the
formality doctrine in Gault:
While due process requirements will, in some instances, introduce a degree of
order and regularity to Juvenile Court proceedings to determine delinquency, and
in contested cases will introduce some elements of the adversary system, nothing
will require that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge be replaced by its
opposite, nor do we here rule upon the question whether ordinary due process
requirements must be observed with respect to hearings to determine the dis-
position of the delinquent child.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
127 Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383, 1397-402
(1974).
121 OHIO R. Juv. P. 29(E)(4).
129 The TASK FORCE REPORT vividly stresses that efforts to treat must be based on accurate
determinations of facts citing an account of an erroneous commitment of a "sexual
psychopath" in a California case:
Thus, the mistake as to the facts not only resulted in an improper conviction but
rendered invalid the psychiatric judgment of the defendant's personality and
propensities. However advanced our techniques for determining what an in-
dividual is, we have not yet approached the point at which we can safely ignore
what he has done. What he has done may often be the most revealing evidence
of what he is.
TASK FORc E REPORT, supra note 4, at 30 quoting from F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19 (1964).
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2. Similar Treatment - Commitment and Stigma
The Supreme Court extended certain due process protections to de-
linquents based on the similarities between delinquency proceedings and
adult criminal trials. The Court found that where there is the possibil-
ity of confinement and where a stigma is attached to the adjudication,
certain due process rights must be observed.' 30 This reasoning should
also be used to extend these due process safeguards to children charged
with unruliness.
While the creation of classifications such as Ohio's unruly category
might have been motivated by a desire to avoid the stigma of delinquency
for children brought before the court for noncriminal misconduct there
are indications that a stigma also attaches to this new label. 13' This
stigma "is probably unavoidable as long as any sort of official action is
taken. And action by a court - however benign - is likely to be the
most severely and permanently labeling of all.' ' 32
The child is, first of all, stigmatized in his own eyes. The delinquent
or unruly label tends to reinforce the particular misconduct because the
child begins to perceive himself as delinquent or unruly and organizes
his behavior accordingly. 1- The distinction in reprehensibility intended
between the two classifications means little to the unruly child for he still
perceives himself as having been accused of doing something bad.'3,
The labeling process also incurs negative reactions from community
members, teachers, and friends toward children who have had juvenile
court contact. 135  There is evidence that known records of arrest hurt
employment chances. 36  This disadvantage extends equally to the un-
130 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense im-
portance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon convic-
tion and because of the certainty that he should be stigmatized by the conviction.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
[A] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be "'delin-
quent" and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in serious-
ness to a felony prosecution.
1d. at 366.
See Dorsen & Reznick, In re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAM. L. Q. 1
(1967); Stiller & Elder, supra note 7; Willey, Ohio's Post-Gault Juvenile Court Law, 3
AKRON L. REV. 152 (1970). For a recent reaflirmance by the Supreme Court that the key
factors in Gault and Winship were loss of liberty and attachment of stigma, see Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
131 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 26.
132 Id.
133 TASK FoRCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 417; THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42, at 80. See
Gold & Williams, National Study of the Aftermath of Apprehension, 3 PRosPEcrus 3
(1969); Grygier, The Concept of "the State of Delinquency" - An Obituary, 18 J. LEGAL
ED. 131, 138 (1965); Lipsett, Due Process as a Gateway to Rehabilitation in the Juvenile
Justice System, 49 B.U.L. REV. 62 (1969).
134 Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383 (1974),
135 Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling upon Youths in the juvenile Justice System: A Review
of the Evidence, 8 LAW & Soc'y REV. 583 (1974).
136 Id. The easy access to juvenile court records is well documented. See In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1967); Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE
L.J. 1383, 1401-02 n.116 (1974); Comment, Delinquent Child: A Legal Term without
Meaning, 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 352, 356-57 (1969); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at
91-93.
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ruly child since the public makes little distinction between the delinquent
child who has committed a criminal act and the unruly child who has
been truant or disobedient - any child who has been subjected to juvenile
court intervention is considered to be "delinquent."'
3 7
The similarity in the stigma attaching to noncriminal and criminal de-
linquent adjudications was recognized by the federal district court in
Gonzalez v. Maillard.38  The Ohio juvenile code also impliedly recog-
nizes that a stigma does attach to adjudications of unruliness for it in-
cludes a provision for the expungement of such records.' 39 It would ap-
pear, then, that the new noncriminal labels used in the juvenile courts
are merely substitutions for the term delinquency. 40
The potential for loss of liberty through incarceration in an institution
is the same for unruly children and those violating lawful court orders
as it is for children adjudicated delinquent for criminal acts. The Ohio
code permits direct commitments to the Ohio Youth Commission for
either category.' 4' It can be argued, therefore, that since unruly children
face the same potential for incarceration and an equally stigmatizing
label as do delinquents, they are entitled to full delinquent due process
rights during the unruly proceeding, including application of the eviden-
tiary standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Any commitment of
an unruly child to the Ohio Youth Commission following a proceeding
where due process protections were not fully applied would be unconsti-
tutional. 142
Unconstitutionality can also be found when a delinquency adjudication
is based upon the violation of a lawful court order issued pursuant to
an unruly adjudication which lacked full delinquency due process pro-
tections. In such a case the child is subjected to the identical potential
for incarceration and the identical stigma as the criminally delinquent
child. 143
Furthermore, even where the disposition of an unruly child is commit-
ment to a county home rather than a state institution it can be argued
137 Orlando & Black, Classification in Juvenile Court: The Delinquent Child and the Child
in Need of Supervision, 25 Juv. Just. 13, 20 (1974).
131 No. 50424 at 8-9 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 94 S. Ct.
1915 (1974).
[lit is dubious whether a criminal charge of public drunkenness or possession
of marijuana carries more stigma than a finding of "idle, dissolute, lewd or im-
moral" behavior.
Note, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction over "Immorar Youth in California, 24 STAN. L. REv.
568, 572 (1972).
139 OHio REV. Con ANN. § 2151.358 (Page Supp. 1974).
140 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 n.31 (1967). In E.J. v. State, 471 P.2d 367 (Alas. 1970),
the court indicated that an order finding a child in need of supervision carries with it a
moral stigma and legal disadvantages.
141 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.354-355 (Page Supp. 1974).
142 Direct commitments of unruly children to the Ohio Youth Commission are unconstitutional
when full delinquent due process protections are not extended to the unruly proceeding.
1972 Op. Arr'y GEN. OF Onto 72-071.
143 But see In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972) (no right to counsel at "un-
disciplined child" hearing which could not result in commitment to institution in which
freedom is curtailed even though child faces delinquency finding and incarceration for
violating probation).
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that the unruly child is still entitled to the same due process protections as
the delinquent child. 144 The commitment, although to a different type of
institution, involves the same loss of liberty. The Supreme Court has
recognized the lack of distinction between the two:
A boy is charged with misconduct. A boy is committed to an
institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is
of no constitutional consequence - and of limited practical mean-
ing - that the institution to which he is committed is called an
Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphe-
mistic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial school"
for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child
is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. 45
The Ohio Supreme Court has also acknowledged that the emphasis
of the Gault case was commitment and stigma and has drawn an analogy
from the juvenile cases to the civil commitment area. In the case of
In Re Fisher146 the Ohio court held that in an involuntary civil commit-
ment proceeding due process requires that individuals alleged to require
commitment be advised of their right to be represented by retained or
appointed counsel. Noting that the key factor in Gault for extending
due process to delinquents was the "awesome prospect of incarceration
in a state institution until the juvenile reaches the age of 21," ' 141 the
court rejected the notion of any purported distinction between juvenile
delinquency proceedings leading to incarceration and involuntary civil
commitments.14 The stigma accompanying commitment to mental in-
stitutions was also acknowledged as a determining factor for extension
of due process rights. 49  But, it is the Ohio court's recognition of the
unfairness of extending fewer due process protections to noncriminal
civil commitments than is provided under Ohio law to persons convicted
of crimes and referred for psychiatric examinatibn that is particularly
appropriate for analogizing to the unruly-delinquent comparison in juve-
nile law:
It seems incongruous to protect the constitutional rights of those
convicted of crimes and subsequently confined to a mental in-
stitution and not provide the same or more extensive protection
to noncriminals.' 50
144 But see In re Carter, 20 Md. App. 633, 318 A.2d 269 (1974) (Gault not applicable to
unruly proceeding, therefore, privilege against self incrimination and Miranda warnings
not applicable); In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972) (standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt and privilege against self-incrimination not required where basis of
delinquency proceeding was that child was uncontrolled and not that he had committed
a public offense); Warner v. State, 254 Ind. 209, 258 N.E.2d 860 (1970) (standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt adopted only with respect to those cases where the
offense, but for the age of the offender, would constitute a crime).
145 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (emphasis added).
I' 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974).
1' Id. at 76, 313 N.E.2d at 855, citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
148 Id.
149 Id.
,50 Id. at 81, 313 N.E.2d at 859.
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Surely, it is just as incongruous to protect the constitutional rights of
juveniles adjudicated delinquent for commission of criminal acts and not
provide the same protection to children incarcerated for entirely non-
criminal misconduct.
B. Circumvention of Kent, Gault, and Winship Due Process Protections
Adjudications under the lawful order and unruly sections can be con-
stitutionally challenged when the facts indicate a possible circumvention
of the due process requirements of Kent, Gault, and Winship. An ex-
ample of such circumvention would be where the authorities wish to
charge a child believed to have committed a criminal act with delinquency
but are unable to meet the rigorous standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt required in delinquency proceedings.' 5 The lawful order section
enables the state to achieve its objective after only a brief delay.
The child can be adjudicated unruly based on the same criminal act or
on some noncriminal misconduct. 5 2 It is a fairly simple matter to find
some basis for an adjudication of unruliness under the overbroad and
vague unruly section. 53 What child has not skipped school, disobeyed a
parent, violated a curfew, or associated with companions thought to be
unsavory by his parents or the court? Moreover, the unruly adjudication
can be proved by mere clear and convincing evidence whether it be based
on a criminal or noncriminal act. 54 With relative ease, then, a child can be
adjudicated unruly, thereby providing the court with jurisdiction to issue
some "lawful order" regarding his future conduct. In view of the vague-
ness of the lawful order section and its potential for arbitrary rulings, the
151 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); OmIo R. Juv. P. 29(E)(4).
152 This type of abuse of New York's unruly statute was noted in Note, Ungovernability:
The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383 (1974), in a report by the authors of an
interview with a juvenile court judge:
In one typical case a boy's mother filed a petition against him. The boy, it turned
out, was an addict and the court mentioned the need for careful handling of this
drug "pusher". Under questioning, the judge informed the authors that she was
convinced that the child had violated penal statutes for selling heroin, "but if we
have to prove this, it requires exact evidence that on such and such a date, at
6:02 p.m., he did such and such," a proof burden easily avoided under ungov-
ernability jurisdiction.
Id. at 1394 n.81.
This type of abuse of the California "immoral conduct" statute which was challenged
in Gonzalez v. Mailliard was discussed in Note, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction over "lm-
morar Youth in California, 24 STAN. L. REV. 568, 579 (1972). In fact, the juveniles
charged under the "immoral conduct" statute in Gonzalez were suspected of robbery
and assault.
1 " The invalidation of the California statute in Gonzalez v. Mailliard for vagueness was
based partly on the potential for total subversion of the Winship beyond a reasonable
doubt standard. Even if the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard were applied to §
601, the state would still have an effective route around the requirements of Winship be-
cause § 601 defines the substance of the offense so broadly that the procedural safe-
guard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt becomes meaningless.
Standards of proof depend on standards of relevance and probativeness, and
these are precluded when the substantive offense covers the entire moral dimen-
sion of one's life.
Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 at 12 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), vacated on jurisdic-
tional grounds, 94 S. Ct. 1915 (1974).
154 OHIO R. Juv. P. 29(E)(4).
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lawful order might be anything within a wide range of admonitions. The
order might be as innocuous as "obey your parents" or "don't miss school
again." If the child subsequently violates the order the court can then
find him to be delinquent under the lawful order section and commit him
to the Ohio Youth Commission for incarceration in a state institution.
Thus the state has succeeded in achieving an adjudication of de-
linquency based on a criminal act without ever having proved that the
child committed the crime by the standard of proof required in delin-
quency proceedings - proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, even
in cases based on underlying criminal acts - the situation which Kent,
Gault, and Winship specifically addressed - the state by this circumven-
tion can totally subvert the due process mandates of the Supreme Court.
The obvious unconstitutionality of such a gross denial of fundamental
fairness prompted California appellate courts to extend various pro-
cedural due process protections to proceedings under that state's non-
criminal juvenile statute in cases where the complaint alleges an under-
lying felony. 5 5 These holdings should be extended in California and
followed in other states, including Ohio, in all unruly proceedings where
the charge is based on an underlying criminal act regardless of degree.
C. Commingled Institutionalization
Even if the same due process protections available to delinquents are
applied to noncriminal adjudications under the unruly section, incar-
ceration of unruly children, directly or via the lawful order section, is
unconstitutional where it results in their commingling with delinquents
who have committed criminal acts. Such commingling is contradictory
to the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile law and, as such, violates the
juvenile's constitutional right to treatment. 5
A thorough analysis of the current status of the right to treatment in
constitutional law is beyond the scope of this paper,'5 7 but brief mention
can be made of the theoretical framework that can be used to establish
the existence of such a right. The rehabilitative rationale which his-
torically has provided the underlying justification for juvenile court non-
criminal jurisdiction implicitly reflects the existence of a constitutional
155 In re H., 5 Cal. App. 3d 781, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Ct. App. 1970) (privilege against self-
incrimination applied to proceeding which declares child a ward upon finding that he is
in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life where petition alleges a felony,
i.e., assault with a deadly weapon and manslaughter); In re R., 274 Cal. App. 2d 749, 79
Cal. Rptr. 247 (Ct. App. 1969) (where proof of allegation that minor was in danger of
leading dissolute life rested solely upon minor's extrajudicial admissions that he had
sold marijuana, minor had right to insist that proof of such allegation be under same
standards as if petition had been brought under statute giving juvenile court jurisdiction
over minors who violate the law); In re Rambeau, 266 Cal. App. 2d 1, 72 Cal. Rptr. 171
(Ct. App. 1963) (privilege against self-incrimination applies to proceeding which declares
child a ward upon finding that he is in danger of leading a dissolute life where petition
alleges a felony, i.e., purchased, possessed, and smoked marijuana).
151 See Gough, supra note 46, at 191.
15 For a discussion of the development of the concept of a right to treatment and its applica-
tion to noncriminal juveniles see Note, Persons in Need of Supervision: Is There a Consti-
tutional Right to Treatment, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 624 (1973).
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right to treatment for juvenile's subject to that jurisdiction. If the prom-
ise of individualized treatment is the only justification for allowing the
state to intervene into the lives of children who have done no worse than
commit some noncriminal form of youthful misconduct such as running
away, it can be argued that children incarcerated for such conduct are
entitled to that rehabilitative care. The treatment objective is specifi-
cally affirmed by the Ohio juvenile code as being one of the major pur-
poses to be fulfilled through the juvenile court's jurisdiction.15
The civil commitment cases also support the theory that juveniles
incarcerated for noncriminal conduct are entitled to more than mere
custodial care and have a right to some form of positive treatment,5 9
particularly in view of the similarity of the consequences of both pro-
cedures such as loss of liberty and stigmatization. It would seem that
any right to treatment extended to adults involuntarily committed for
mental illness is also, under the Supreme Court's "fundamental fairness"
test, a right of juveniles committed for noncriminal conduct.
Commingling destroys the possibility of rehabilitation in several
ways. As discussed earlier, individualized treatment has not been pro-
vided by the juvenile courts, and there is evidence that institutionaliza-
tion has little effect in reducing crime' 6 ° Indeed, it may actually cause
l' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.01(A) (Page Supp. 1974). This section indicates that one
of the purposes of the new juvenile code is:
(A) to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of
children subject to (the juvenile code).
151 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In the Donaldson case the Supreme
Court held that the state may not confine a nondangerous "mentally ill" person in an
institution without providing him with some positive form of treatment. The holding,
however, was narrowly confined to the facts of the case and does not establish a right to
treatment for all patients who are confined by the state for mental illness. It is limited
to those patients who present no danger to themselves or others and are capable of sur-
viving in freedom by themselves or with the help of family members or friends. Id. at
576. An analogy can be drawn to juvenile law and it can be argued that the child
adjudicated unruly for purely noncriminal conduct such as running away, should not be
confined in an institution without some positive form of treatment where it is established
that he presents no danger to others or himself. If he is capable of surviving safely on his
own or with the help of family members, friends, or social service agency assistance the
state should not be permitted to confine him without providing him with meaningful re-
habilitative treatment.
Other courts have drawn a "right to treatment" analogy from civil commitment cases
to juvenile cases, see, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71 (E.D.Tex. 1974) (the
court closed two juvenile institutions for failing to provide adequate care and treatment);
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 598-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (which held that the
eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was violated
with respect to PINS who were not temporary detainees and who were held in New York
detention centers without adequate treatment:
[t]here can be no doubt that the right to treatment, generally, for those held in
noncriminal custody . . . has by now been recognized by the Supreme Court,
the lower federal courts and the courts of New York.
Id. at 599.
The Ohio Supreme Court has drawn the analogy in reverse, from the juvenile cases
(Gault) to the civil commitment area to support the argument for a right to counsel for
persons subject to involuntary commitments. In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d
851 (1974).
1S0 Clarke, Getting 'Em Out of Circulation: Does Incarceration of Juvenile Offenders Reduce
Crime?, 65 J. CIuM. L. & C. 528 (1974).
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more harm than good.16 There is further evidence that institutionali-
zation may be particularly inappropriate for the noncriminal juvenile
because it removes him from his family, which is where the problem
must be solved. 162  Further, commingled incarceration subverts rehabili-
tative goals by exposing the noncriminal juvenile to the negative influ-
ences of a criminally oriented subculture.5 3 It would appear, therefore,
that the noncriminal juvenile's right to appropriate and individual treat-
ment is violated by incarceration in an institution which also houses
delinquents who have committed crimes.
Some states have restricted institutionalization to those juveniles
who commit criminal acts. 6 4  Others, such as New York, provide sep-
arate institutions. In New York it was held that confinement of an
unruly child in a state training school with criminal juveniles did not
qualify as supervision and treatment as defined by state law because of
the dangers of commingling. 16 5 Regardless of the current status of a
161 In Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (1971), affd mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972), the
court quoted a statement made by the Director of the New York State Division for Youth:
With the exception of a relatively few youths, it would probably be better for all
concerned if young delinquents were not detected, apprehended or institutional-
ized. Too many of them get worse in our care.
Id. at 378, quoting Samuels, When Children Collide with the Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1971, § 44 (Magazine) at 146.
162 Additionally, institutionalization of a beyond-control child is likely to be in-
herently self-defeating because it removes the focus from the family where the
problem is based and where it must ultimately be resolved.
Gough, supra note 46, at 191.
See id., at 191-92, for a discussion of the results of studies showing the failure of
incarceration of PINS in terms of high rates of recidivism. For a duscussion of the
inappropriateness of institutionalizing "runaways" see Note, Runaways: A Non-Judicial
Approach, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 110 (1974). The runaway doesn't view himself as break-
ing the law:
[H]e simply views his home situation as intolerable and decides to escape. Yet,
as a result of his impulsive course of conduct, he may acquire a juvenile record.
Although his parents certainly share responsibility for the family breakdown, the
law places the burden on the youth - the least mature party who may now be-
come stigmatized as a delinquent or a PINS.
Id. at 117-18.
163 [A]nd to commingle youth who are in rebellion against authority, but have
manifested no conduct overtly violative of criminal law, with youths who have
been adjudiqated delinquents simply affords maximum opportunity for tutelage
of the former by the latter.
Gough, supra note 46, at 191.
[T]he very fact of incarceration, which by necessarily posing a series of prob-
lems of personal deprivation for inmates, generates a more or less antithetical
subculture which negates and subverts formal programs of rehabilitation. The
logistics of processing delinquents or criminal populations brings large numbers
of recidivists to the institutions, where they control informal communication and
face-to-face interaction which importantly shapes the course of inmate sociali-
zation.
TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 4, at 96.
164 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.03(b), 54.04(g) (1975). See note 183 infra for text of
statute § 51.03. Section 54.04(g) prohibits commitment to the Texas Youth Council for
conduct defined in §§ 51.03(b)(2)-(4). The Supreme Court of Alaska through narrow
statutory interpretation has held that noncriminal children in need of supervision may
not be institutionalized. In re E.M.D., 490 P,2d 658, 659-60 (Alas. 1971).
165 In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 591, 300 N.E.2d 424, 425, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (1973),
quoting, In re Ellery C., 40 A.D.2d 862, 864, 337 N.Y.S.2d 936, 940 (1972).
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constitutional right to treatment for juveniles under Ohio law or federal
constitutional principles, it would appear that at the very least the non-
criminal child is constitutionally entitled to be protected from the dan-
gers and abuses of commingled institutionalization.
D. Escalation of Crime and Punishment
Adjudications of delinquency based on noncriminal violations of law-
ful court orders made pursuant to prior noncriminal unruly adjudica-
tions violate the due process clause because such adjudications are in
effect escalations of crime and punishment on the basis of mere non-
criminal probation violations. Assuming that direct commitments to
the Ohio Youth Commission from unruly adjudications are unconstitu-
tional, 166 the only proper dispositions of unruly children would be pro-
bation or placement in a county home, foster home, or some other non-
institutionalized treatment facility. 1 7  A later commitment to a state
institution pursuant to the lawful order section involves an increase in
punishment and the attachment of the criminal delinquency label.
A parole or probation revocation in the adult criminal system puts
into effect the original sentence based on the original charge. If the
charge was a misdemeanor, the offense cannot be escalated to a felony
on the basis of a noncriminal probation violation. The only way the
accused can face a more serious charge is if he commits a more serious
offense. He then could face a sentence on the felony charge in addition
to possible execution of the original misdemeanor sentence.
In the juvenile process under Ohio law, however, a child can face a
more serious charge without having committed a more serious offense.
The unruly child can be placed on probation or made subject to a lawful
order of the court by placement in a home or treatment facility whereby
it is implied from such placement that he remain at the facility. Upon
violation of the order by some noncriminal act such as disobeying par-
ents, violating a curfew, or leaving the placement facility, the child can
be charged with delinquency and incarcerated in the state institution.
If the procedure permitted by the lawful order section were allowed
to prevail in the adult criminal system it would occur as follows. A per-
son would be placed on probation for commission of a misdemeanor
such as public intoxication. Various rules and regulations of probation
would be imposed such as "stop drinking." Upon violation of one of
the rules by continued drinking or intoxication the misdemeanor could
then be escalated to a felony, the probation revoked, and the individual
sent to the Ohio Penitentiary!
Such procedure in an adult court would involve a gross denial of due
process rights. An escalation in crime and punishment on the basis of a
probation violation involving the same or lesser degree of misconduct
as that involved in the original finding is certainly a more serious denial
166 1972 Op. A'Ir'y GEN. OF OHIO 72-071.
167 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.354 (Page Supp. 1974). Dispositions permitted for de-
linquent children are listed in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.355 (Page Supp. 1974).
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of due process than is the revocation of parole without a full hearing
held to be an essential of due process by the Supreme Court in Morrissey
v. Brewer.'6s
Juveniles are also entitled to due process protections when faced
with potential probation or parole revocation.169 Employing the funda-
mental fairness test of Gault, the New York Court of Appeals concluded
that due process requires a fair hearing with the right to counsel prior to
revocation of juvenile parole. 70 The court said the proceeding
involves a deprivation of liberty just as much as did the original
criminal action and, by that token, falls within the protective
ambit of due process.' 7
1
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the procedures at a hearing
involving possible revocation of a juvenile's "liberty under supervision"
must be the same as those afforded adults since there is no constitutional
difference between a parole of an adult and such supervised liberty of a
juvenile.1 72  Therefore, any escalation in crime or punishment via the
lawful order section based on a noncriminal violation of an unruly child
probation violates the juvenile's due process right to fundamental fair-
ness in probation revocation proceedings.
Recent court decisions and statutory revisions in four states provide
excellent support for arguments challenging the validity of noncriminal
delinquency adjudications under the lawful order section. Without ex-
pressly addressing due process concepts, two state appellate decisions
have held that violations of lawful orders under statutes identical to Ohio's
lawful order section must be limited to acts which would be crimes if
committed by adults.
In the case of In Re Butterfield, 73 the court granted a writ of habeas
corpus to a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for violation of a lawful
court order issued pursuant to California's unruly section.7 4 An attempted
suicide constituted the violation. The adjudication of delinquency was
overturned because the child was not advised of his right to remain silent.
But, in dicta, the court expressed the view that the lawful order clause
of the delinquency section required a criminal act for implementation:
The comparatively stringent wardship permissible under section
602 appears to be designed for delinquent youngsters. The
present subject has violated no law and her second suicide at-
1- 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
"' See generally 1973 Wis. L. REv. 954.
170 People ex rel. Silbert v. Cohen, 29 N.Y.2d 12, 271 N.E.2d 908, 323 N.Y.S.2d 422
(1971).
171 Id. at 14, 271 N.E.2d at 910, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
172 Bernal v. Hershman, 54 Wis. 2d 626, 196 N.W.2d 721 (1972). See Gunsolus v. Gagnon,
454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971).
113 252 Cal. App. 2d 977, 61 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1967).
114 See note 65 supra, for text of the statute which is equivalent to Ohio's unruly statute.
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tempt, like the first, is the apparent product of psychic imbal-
ance rather than delinquency.
7 5
In People v. E.R.,i78 the precise question at issue was whether or not
a violation of probation in a Colorado unruly adjudication was a viola-
tion of a lawful court order within the meaning of the delinquency stat-
ute. The child's violative behavior consisted of truancy from school and
refusal to return to foster care. In holding that a noncriminal violation
of an unruly probation could not constitute a violation of a lawful order
under the delinquency statute, the Colorado appellate court reasoned that
the juvenile code indicated legislative intent to segregate unruly children
from criminal delinquents and to provide them with separate treatment and
care. As evidence of this intent the court noted that unruly children
may not be initially placed in institutions for juvenile delinquents; that
the statute dealt with dispositions of unruly children separately from
the dispositions of delinquents; and, that the first two categories of the
legislative definition of delinquency include only acts which if committed
by adults would constitute crimes.
The reasoning of the Colorado court can be applied to Ohio law. The
Ohio legislature has provided that unruly children cannot be initially
committed to the Ohio Youth Commission. 177  It is possible under the
statute to order such commitment after a further hearing, 17 but this type
of direct commitment has been ruled unconstitutional by a formal opinion
of the Ohio Attorney General. 79 The dispositions for unruly and delin-
quent children are provided for in separate sections of the Ohio juvenile
code.8 0 In Ohio's definition of delinquency the first clause includes
only criminal acts,' 8' and therefore, violations of the second clause (the
lawful order section) should also be confined to acts which, if committed
by adults, would constitute crimes. Consequently, the lawful order sec-
tion is superfluous because these acts can form the basis of delinquency
adjudications under the first clause of the delinquency section.
A lawful order clause identical to Ohio's was revised and moved to
the Illinois unruly section effective January 1, 1974.182 Now any non-
175 In re Butterfield, 252 Cal. App. 2d 794, 800, 61 Cal. Rptr. 874, 879 (1967) (emphasis
added).
176 29 Colo. App. 525, 487 P.2d 824 (1971).
177 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.354 (Page Supp. 1974).
'T An unruly child may be placed on probation, committed to a county home, foster home,
or public or private treatment facility. He cannot be committed to the Ohio Youth
Commission for placement in a state institution unless:
If after making such disposition the court finds, upon further hearing, that the
child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation under such disposition, the
court may make a disposition otherwise authorized under section 2151.355
[delinquency dispositions] of the Revised Code.
Id.
179 1972 Op. Arr'y GEN. OF OHIo 72-071.
is0 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.354, .355 (Page Supp. 1974).
181 Id. § 2151.02(A). See note 5 supra, for text of the statute.
1s1 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-2, -3 (Smith-Hurd 1972):
§ 702-2. Delinquent Minor
Those who are delinquent include any minor who prior to his 17th birthday has
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criminal violation of an unruly or delinquency probation in Illinois may
only constitute an unruly violation. The child can be adjudicated unruly
for the violation but not delinquent.
The new Texas family code contains two lawful order clauses, 8 3 but
their use with regard to delinquency adjudications is limited to children
previously adjudicated delinquent or in need of supervision based on un-
derlying criminal acts. A child originally adjudicated in need of super-
vision on the basis of noncriminal conduct cannot be escalated to delin-
quency for a second noncriminal offense.
These cases and statutes provide strong support for a revision and limi-
tation of Ohio's lawful order section. They indicate recognition by
some courts and legislators of the constitutional infirmity in the lawful or-
der section's application to children brought within the court's jurisdic-
tion for purely noncriminal behavior. There is no justification for
escalating the charge to a snore serious offense on the basis of a second
noncriminal act particularly in view of the notoriously vague and over-
broad juvenile statutes which fail to provide the accused with any fair
notice of the types of conduct proscribed. Neither is there any justifi-
cation for failing to provide children with at least the fundamentals of
fairness in proceedings which can have such an enormous impact on
their lives and on their liberty.
violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal
or state law or municipal ordinance; and (b) prior to January 1, 1974, any minor
who has violated a lawful court order made under this Act.
§ 702-3. Minor Otherwise in Need of Supervision
Those otherwise in need of supervision include (a) any minor under 18 years of
age who is beyond the control of his parents, guardian or other custodian; (b)
any minor subject to compulsory school attendance who is habitually truant from
school; and (c) any minor who is an addict, as defined in the "Drug Addiction
Act"; and (d) on or after January 1, 1974, any minor who violates a lawful court
order made under this Act (footnote omitted).
113 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03 (1975) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Delinquent conduct is conduct, other than a traffic offense, that violates:
(1) a penal law of this state punishable by imprisonment or by confinement
in jail; or
(2) a reasonable and lawful order of a juvenile court entered under Section
54.04 or 54.05 of this code; except that a violation of a reasonable and lawful
order of a juvenile court entered pursuant to a determination that the child en-
gaged in conduct indicating a need for supervision as defined in Section
51.03(b)(2) or 51.03(b)(3) of this code does not constitute delinquent conduct.
(b) Conduct indicating a need for supervision is:
(1) conduct, other than a traffic offense, that on three or more occasions vio-
lates either of the following:
(A) the penal laws of this state of the grade of misdemeanor that are
punishable by fine only; or
(B) the penal ordinances of any political subdivision of this state;
(2) conduct which violates the compulsory school attendance laws;
(3) the voluntary absence of a child from his home without the consent of his
parent or guardian for a substantial length of time or without intent to return;
or
(4) the violation of an order of a juvenile court entered under Section 54.04 or
54.05 of this code pursuant to a determination that the child engaged in conduct
which violates the compulsory school attendance laws or the voluntary absence
of the child from his home without the consent of his parent or guardian for a
substantial length of time or without intent to return.
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IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
Adjudications under the lawful order and unruly sections can also be
challenged on equal protection grounds under the fourteenth amend-
ment.184 These challenges should be asserted in conjunction with due
process attacks as they are less likely to succeed. 8 5  Courts are likely
to uphold disparities in treatment between delinquent and unruly chil-
dren if they apply the reasonableness test 8 6 to the statutory classifica-
tion rather than the strict scrutiny standard 8 7 applied only to fundamen-
tal interests18 or suspect classifications.8 9
Although a court may apply the less rigorous "reasonableness test,"
under which the state need only show that the classification or disparity
of treatment has some reasonable relationship to a proper state objec-
tive,190 there exists, nevertheless, a basis for attacking adjudications
based on violations of court orders and unruly adjudications. The differ-
ence in treatment between these and delinquency adjudications vis-h-vis
the due process protections afforded each proceeding bears no rea-
sonable relationship to the achievement of the state's purpose to rehabil-
itate and treat both categories of children. Rehabilitation cannot be ef-
fective in either case when there has been an incorrect determination of
fact. If the child has not misbehaved, he cannot be treated. Also, the
noncriminal child faces the same type of incarceration and the same so-
cial and legal disadvantages from the stigma of the unruly label or law-
ful order section delinquent label as the delinquent convicted of a crime.
Therefore, even under a standard of minimum rationality, 1 1 there ap-
pears to be no reasonable basis justifying the different quantum of proof
required in unruly and delinquency adjudications.
An additional equal protection challenge against unruly adjudications
is that such vague statutes are enforced discriminately on the basis of
sex. Girls are punished more often than boys for offenses involving sex-
"' See Stiller & Elder, supra note 7.
185 Id.
18 E.g., In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972).
17 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), wherein the Supreme Court invalidated the
existing law and two proposed apportionment plans for electing members to the Alabama
Legislature as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
laws affecting the right to vote must be subject to careful scrutiny when challenged as
discriminatory. Id. Therefore, under the strict scrutiny standard the state must make
an honest and good faith effort to eliminate the disparity as far as practicable. Id. Under
the reasonableness test, however, the state need only show that a classification is reason-
ably related to some proper state objective. In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 191 S.E.2d 702
(1972).
18 See, e.g., Harper v. Virgina Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote).
1s9 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (race).
1SO See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
191 Id. Under the standard of minimum rationality there is a presumption of constitutional-
ity and the classification will be constitutionally invalidated only if there is no relation
between it and the achievement of the state's objective. In other words, if any set of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify the statutory discrimination it will not be set
aside.
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ual conduct, promiscuity and staying out late. 9 2 That such use is made
of these statutes was implicitly admitted by the court in E.S.G. v.
State,193 which upheld a broad noncriminal juvenile statute:
The obvious reason for granting such broad and general jurisdic-
tion is seen when one makes even a cursory attempt to define
all the types and patterns of behavior and conduct injurious to
a child. The need to correct habits and patterns of behavior
which are injurious to the health or morals of the child goes to
the very heart of our Juvenile Act. The judge in this case ob-
served that most girls who came before said court were charged
with violations of this section.194
The explanation of this selective enforcement is the fear of pregnancy
and unwanted children. 195 The statutes, however, allow judges to ex-
press their own prejudices regarding female behavior and to subject girls
to incarceration for acts which do not as often result in commitment of
boys. This is nothing less than the "double standard," legally sanc-
tioned. 96 It can be argued that even under the less strict reasonableness
standard there is no basis for this differentiation in treatment since the
same behavior on the part of boys may bring about the same result sought
to be prevented by the state - pregnancy and unwanted children.197
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to outline the major arguments
that can be used to attack adjudications under Ohio's unruly and lawful
order sections. That these statutes lack facial validity is painfully obvious
from just a moment's attempt to discern the meaning and application
of their language with regard to specific types of conduct.
There is no justification for a broad omnibus statute such as the law-
ful order section. The court has the inherent power to hold in contempt
anyone in violation of a court order in connection with court proceedings.
The court also has the inhcrent power to execute dispositions held in
abeyance under delinquency or unruly adjudications. Thus the child
violating a condition of probation can be committed according to the
dispositions permitted for the type of misconduct constituting the original
charge. There is no precedent or comparison in adult criminal law for the
grossly unfair procedure permitted under the lawful order section which
allows the crime and punishment to be escalated on the basis of a non-
criminal probation violation. For these reasons the lawful order section
192 Gold, Equal Protection for Juvenile Girls in Need of Supervision in New York State, 17
N.Y.L.F. 570 (1971).
113 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
194 Id. at 226.
G9 Cold, supra note 192, at 592.
'9 Id. at 593. Comment, Juvenile Delinquency Laws: Juvenile Women and the Double
Standard of Morality, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 313 (1971).
117 Gold, supra note 192, at 570.
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should be repealed by the state legislature or declared unconstitutional
by the courts.
There is no reasonable justification for the distinction between un-
ruly and delinquent children in terms of the due process protections af-
forded each classification. Unruly children are subjected to the same
plight as delinquent children. It is therefore a violation of the Supreme
Court's mandate to deny "the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment" to children subjected to unruly proceedings.
The entire jurisdiction of juvenile courts over children charged with
noncriminal conduct has been subjected to mounting criticism in view of
the lack of rehabilitative success and the numerous abuses to which
the process is exposed. Such abuses include its invocation by angry parents
seeking the court's aid to discipline their children whose misbehavior may
amount to nothing worse than vulgar language, refusal to perform chores,
or association with friends found objectionable by the parents;198 use of
the unruly category where the facts actually indicate that a dependency
or neglect proceeding would be most appropriate; 199 and use of noncrim-
inal jurisdiction where the act complained of falls within the statutory
definition of delinquency but there is insufficient proof available or there
is a conscious determination by court personnel to circumvent the due
process requirements of the delinquency proceeding. 00
Recommendations for total removal of the noncriminal jurisdiction
have been increasing. 201 A Presidential commission recommended that
serious consideration be given to the complete elimination of jurisdiction
over conduct-illegal-only-for-children in view of the little good and pos-
sible harm such jurisdiction actually achieves. 202 Most recently, the Na-
tional Council on Crime and Delinquency issued a policy statement ad-
vocating the removal of all status offenses from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court.
Imprisonment of a status offender serves no humanitarian or re-
habilitative purpose. It is, instead, unwarranted punishment,
unjust because it is disproportionate to the harm done by the
child's noncriminal behavior. It cannot be justified under
either a treatment or a punishment rationale.203
The abolition of juvenile court noncriminal jurisdiction does not mean
that children in need of supervision will be put adrift without a helping
hand from the community. The President's commission recommended
the establishment of neighborhood youth servicing agencies to provide
198 Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383, 1387 n.33,
1394 (1974).
191 Id. at 1391-93.
200 Id. at 1393-94.
201 McNulty, supra note 39; Stiller & Elder, supra note 7.
202 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
203 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, JURISDICTION OVER STATUS OFFENSES
SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE JUVENILE COURT, PoLICY STATEMENT, at 2 (Dec. 1974).
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referral services to troubled children and their families.0 4 The object of
such agencies is to divert noncriminal children from the court system to
other agencies that can provide appropriate help and guidance within the
context of the home community thereby avoiding the stigma and penal
consequences of the juvenile court process.
Elimination of juvenile court jurisdiction over unruly children will
not affect the court's jurisdiction over delinquent children or truly neg-
lected and dependent children. Abolition of the unruly jurisdiction would
mean only that noncriminal misbehavior would be dealt with in a non-
criminal context - through community services designed to provide the
help that, in the juvenile court system, has often resulted in mere cus-
todial incarceration.
The argument for retaining noncriminal jurisdiction because alter-
native community services are unavailable was effectively rebutted by
judge David Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia who pointed out that such services are not available
precisely because the juvenile court has maintained its noncriminal juris-
diction.20 5 Schools and public agencies will continue to refer cases to
the court as long as it holds out its jurisdiction as a solution for troubled
children - a promise of help largely unfulfilled.
PATRICIA SIMIA KLERI
204 THE CHALLENGE, supra note 42. See Note, A Proposal for the More Effective Treatment
of the "Unruly" Child in Ohio: The Youth Services Bureau, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 275 (1970).
205 Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 Jtv. CT. J. 42, 44 (1970).
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